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Abstract:
This paper verifies the existence of the inverse productivity relationship in the ICRISAT data and
examines the role that land quality and imperfect markets play in generating it. The empirical approach is
straightforward, and allows for more direct tests of the land quality or imperfect labor market hypotheses
than previous studies. The ICRISAT information on plot-level soil quality and measures of labor and land
market failures are used to see if either land quality or market failure can fully account for the inverse
relationship. Differences in land quality measured by soil type, irrigation, and the value of farm land
largely explain the IP relationship in the random effects profit regression, but not in labor demand
regressions. Controlling for labor and land market failures and differences in soil quality eliminates the IP
relationship for male labor, but not female labor in the random effects estimates. The inverse relationship
is much stronger in fixed-effects than random-effects estimates, suggesting that the farm size variable may
be subject to measurement error. Instrumental variables estimation is used to correct possible measurement
error in farm size, wiping out the IP relationship in the fixed effects estimates of both profits and female
labor demand.1I follow the convention of referring to output per acre of land farmed as productivity, although it
clearly ignores differences in the intensity of input use, especially labor use. Indeed, as I discuss below,
labor use per acre is an important source of differences in output per acre across farmers, and is used as
another way of defining and explaining the inverse productivity relationship.
2No structural relationship is implied in the estimation, although the connection to Cobb-Douglas is
clear. In practice, applied studies often begin with the reduced form suggested here without relating those
results back to a structural economic model.
3See Berry and Cline (1979) for a summary of previous research through the mid-1970s.
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Inverse Productivity: Land Quality, Labor Markets, and Measurement Error
I. Introduction to the problem
A recurring puzzle in empirical work on developing country agriculture is the “Inverse
Productivity” (IP) relationship,
1 which is summarized in the following straightforward empirical model.In
the basic IP relationship the dependent variable, Yi, is either output or profits.Let X i denote a vector of
control variables, and let the total area farmed be denoted by Ai.A reduced-form empirical relationship to
be estimated is given by
2:
where are parameters to be estimated, and ui is a random error term.Since ( measures the ", $, and (
elasticity of output or profits with respect to area, estimates of ( less than one suggest that total output
rises less quickly than total area farmed, and the inverse productivity hypothesis holds.The IP relationship
is also observed in labor demand relations in many developing countries, e.g. where Yi is household labor
demand, and labor demand rises less quickly than area farmed.Benjamin (1995) verifies that the IP
relationship exists for both output and labor demand for rice farmers in Java, and Barrett (1996) verifies
the same phenomenon for Madagascar.Numerous other studies have identified the inverse productivity in
other countries.
3
A simple and direct explanation of the inverse relationship could lie in the production function.If
small farmers are technically more efficient than large farmers, this would generate the observed2
4A number of these studies are summarized in Berry and Cline.Carter (1984) also fails to reject
constant returns to scale in India.
relationship.However, Carter (1984) finds that smaller farmers in India would produce 15 percent less
output than larger farmers given the same inputs (Carter, 1984, p.141) and numerous studies have shown
that it is impossible to reject constant returns to scale for agricultural production in both the Indian context
and elsewhere.
4 In fact, increasing returns to scale seems intuitively more likely for the small farms
characteristic of much of the developing world.
Two alternative explanations of the IP relationship have been suggested in the literature on
developing country agriculture, with important implications for policy.Sen (1975), and more recently
Benjamin (1995), have suggested that the IP relationship may be traced to unobserved differences in land
quality which are not adequately controlled for in regression analysis.If the IP relationship arises because
small farmers on average farm land of higher quality, then public policies designed to redistribute land to
small landholders will not raise (and may lower) agricultural output and rural incomes.Alternatively,
market failures, especially labor-market failures, are often argued to be a primary cause of the IP
relationship in labor: Farmers who can not sell their labor in the wage-labor market apply it to their own
fields.If imperfect labor markets are responsible, then a policy of land redistribution will improve
efficiency, raise agricultural output and lower inequality.Of course, the two explanations are not mutually
exclusive.It is possible that the distribution of land quality across households arises as a response to labor
market imperfections.
This paper tests competing explanations of the inverse relationship using the widely-used and
important ICRISAT dataset on the semi-arid tropics of India.Given the widespread use of ICRISAT data,
explaining the source of the IP relationship should be of wide interest.Moreover, the ICRISAT data offer a
number of advantages over previous studies in testing competing explanations of the IP relationship.In
particular, a rich set of variables measuring land quality allow for better tests of the omitted land quality3
5I did not include data from the final two villages--Rampura and Rampura Kalan–because these
data are generally deemed to be less reliable than other villages.
hypothesis, and data on labor market activities permit more careful testing of the imperfect labor market
hypothesis.The panel nature of the data allow estimation of both random and fixed effects, which proves
useful in looking at the role of measurement error.
The structure of the paper is as follows.In Section II, I consider agricultural production in the
semi-arid tropics, discuss the severity of the IP relationship, and suggest that the empirical results are
consistent with measurement error in the farm size variable.I then go on to test competing explanations in
light the possibility of measurement error using a straightforward approach.To test the role of omitted
land quality, I add measures of household level land quality to the profit and labor demand regressions to
see how much of the inverse relationship is explained away (Section III).To test the role of imperfect
labor markets, I include village level measures of labor and land market characteristics to the regressions
(Section IV).In Section V, I test the possibility that measurement error in the farm size variable may
contribute to the estimated IP relationship, exacerbated in practice by fixed effects estimation.Section VI
concludes.
II. Inverse Productivity in the Semi-Arid Tropics of India
I examine the IP relationship in Indian agriculture using data collected by the International Crop
Research Institute for the Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) on rural households in three distinct agro-climatic
regions of India between 1975 and 1985.Data are available from three of the study villages for all ten
years, from three villages for four years, and from two other villages for four years, for a total of eight
villages.
5 Table 1 presents sample means for the variables used in the paper, based on a sample of 1060
households drawn from across the eight villages.
Households were surveyed and the quantity of inputs to, and outputs from, crop production at two-
weekly intervals throughout the year were recorded.Agricultural production in the semi-arid tropics is4
characterized by two main growing seasons.The rainy (kharif) season begins with the onset of the monsoon
when soils are water-rich and germination is easy.The post-rainy (rabi) season, which is less important in
overall agriculture, begins after the monsoon, drawing on moisture stored in the soil after rainy-season
crops have been grown.Weather is a major source of the uncertainty surrounding the household’s
production environment and crop yields are highly susceptible to variations in the timing and duration of
the monsoon.
Agriculture in the semi-arid tropics of India is characterized by a great deal of heterogeneity in
production.The crop mix varies distinctly from village to village and across soil types, reflecting in part
differing agro-climatic conditions.This requires more care in measuring “output” than in the case of
monoculture.I choose revenues net of the costs of hired and family labor and variable inputs as the
measure of output.Family labor is valued at the prevailing village-level wage and all other inputs are
evaluated at village prices as well.This assumes that farmers are profit maximizing and that the choice of
crop mix and the allocation of labor across crops is optimal.One direction for future research would be to
reexamine the inverse productivity hypothesis with weaker assumptions on farmer behavior.
I did not include the implicit rental value of farm land in my costs of production.If interest lies in
measuring the returns to farming net of differences in land quality, then rental cost of land should not be
included in profit calculations. To the extent that land quality differences, separate from the differences in
managerial ability or effort, lead to higher yields and, ceteris paribus, higher returns per acre to farming,
we would expect these differences to be capitalized into land prices. Indeed, I will later use data on the
value of land per acre to examine the hypothesis that land-quality differences account for the inverse
productivity relationship.
I amended equation (1) to take account of the panel nature of the ICRISAT data. Allowing for the
simplest form of household level heterogeneity, I assume that the constant term in equation (2) varies by
household:5
6In the Java data, Benjamin found that using total available land, as opposed to total cropped area,
resulted in a slightly more severe inverse relationship.
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for households. The intercept term "i is allowed to vary across individuals, but not the slope i'1...N
coefficients $. The proper econometric model for the "i is an issue of some concern. If the intercept terms
"i are viewed as parametric shifts in the intercept term of the regression line, then treating them as fixed for
a given household in the sample is appropriate, giving rise to the fixed effects estimator. If, on the other
hand, the sampled cross-sectional observations are viewed as drawn from a larger random population, the
"i become random variables themselves which must be estimated, giving rise to the random effects model.
The choice of fixed effects or random effects is important since using random effects will yield biased
coefficient estimates if there are fixed effects that are correlated with variables in (2). The issue is
complicated considerably when any of the right-hand side variables in (2) are subject to measurement
error, as discussed below.
Obviously the measure of total area farmed, Ait, is a crucial variable in these regressions and must
be constructed with some care in the ICRISAT data to account for the two distinct cropping periods. I
calculate total area as the sum of acreage planted in the kharif and rabi seasons, counting twice those acres
planted in both seasons, but not adjusting for intercropping within a season on a given plot, following
Benjamin (1995). Accounting for both kharif and rabi production should work to ameliorate the inverse
relationship where it exists.
6
Variations in total area farmed are of interest themselves, given its role in the IP phenomenon.
Figure 1 summarizes the sources of variation in total cropped area in the three main study villages by
household. Total cropped area (in both the kharif and rabi seasons) is plotted on the vertical axis by6
7Most of the variation in Aurepalle and Kanzara occurs in area farmed during the kharif season. In
contrast, area planted to rabi production varies quite a lot within the household in Shirapur, since rabi
production is more important there. Kharif production accounts for only 40 percent of gross cropped area
in Shirapur in an average season (Walker and Ryan, p. 34).
8For both Aurepalle and Kanzara the within-household variation in area is much less important,
accounting for only about 10 percent of the total.
9It is worth noting differences in kharif and rabi season production across the villages. Among the
three main villages, kharif production is far more important than rabi production in Aurepalle and Kanzara,
accounting for 90 percent of gross cropped area. In contrast, most of the production in Shirapur occurs in
the rabi season.
household, so that a household is represented by a “column” of scatterplots.
7 As can be seen, there is
substantial variation across time within households in total area farmed, and the greatest within-household
variation is in Shirapur. In fact, inter-household differences in average area explain only about three-
fourths of the total variation in area farmed in Shirapur, with the remaining one-fourth explained by within
household differences.
8
Some of the variation within household may reflect changes in land rented or sharecropped in.
There is substantial variation in the measured share of planted acreage that is sharecropped or leased in
across villages (Figure 2) and within households across time as well (Figure 3). Sharecropping and renting
together account for about one-fourth of land farmed in the ICRISAT villages (Shaban, 1987). Part of the
variation within households may also reflect the impact of the monsoon on planting decisions. While it may
be difficult to add area in light of a strong monsoon, farmers do respond to bad monsoons by fallowing land
(Walker and Ryan, p. 34). Area planted is more likely to respond to rainfall shocks in Aurepalle than the
other study villages, since rainfall is more erratic (Walker and Ryan, p. 36).
The ability to plant during the rabi season represents a margin of adjustment in total cropped area,
although this is somewhat constrained by soil type.
9 Sharecropping or leasing might also represent an
important margin of adjustment, with farm households sharecropping if weather appears favorable.
Coefficient estimates based on (2) (e.g. that condition on Ait ignoring its endogeneity) will be biased, where7
10Results in Table 2 are from a slightly larger sample of farmers than those in the remainder of the
paper. To facilitate use of instrumental variables, some observations were dropped from the estimation.
Several regressions were run to compare results between these two samples, and the results did not differ
significantly.
11Note that the appropriate significance level for the coefficient is in relation to one, and the t-
statistic reported in the table is for a null-hypothesis that (=1.
the bias will depend on the correlation between planted acreage and the random component uit. But this
would seem likely to work against the observed IP relationship. If farmers expand area farmed in response
to productivity shocks, then the coefficient on total area farmed from equation (2) would be biased upward.
For endogeneity to contribute to the inverse productivity result, farmers would have to plant fewer acres in
response to a positive productivity shock.
I first estimate a simple profit equation conditional on exogenous weather shocks, real village-level
wages, the real price of fertilizer, and the real price of fodder and sorghum, two crops which are found in
all villages. Wages are measured for two different periods during the crop production year. Period 1 is the
planting period and that part of the crop production cycle before weather uncertainty is resolved. Period 2
is the harvest period after uncertainty about yields has been resolved. All wages are measured as village
averages, by gender, converted to real dollars using the village-level consumer price index. The sample
includes farmers with total cultivation ranging from about 0.4 acre to over 100 acres, so there is a wide
dispersion of holdings.
10
Results in column (1) of Table 2 show random effects estimates. The parameter ( is estimated to
be 0.89 and is significantly less than one at the 1 percent level.
11 Both the rainfall coefficients and the
coefficients on wages and prices are jointly statistically significant at the 1 percent level. While the rainfall
variables are jointly significant at the one percent level, only the date of the monsoon onset is individually
significant at the five percent level and negative, suggesting that a delay in the monsoon onset lowers
farmer profits. The first period male wage is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. The8
coefficient on fertilizer price and second period male wages is estimated to be positive and statistically
significant, at odds with economic theory. Other price and wage variables are not significantly different
from zero.
I also estimated the model using fixed effects, for comparison. Column 2 of Table 2 shows fixed-
effects estimates. The coefficient ( is estimated to be 0.62 and is significantly less than one at the one-
percent level. The inverse relationship with profits is far more severe with fixed effects than random
effects estimates. Other coefficients are similar to those obtained from random effects estimation. The
coefficients on the rainfall shocks are jointly significant at the five percent level, as are the set of
coefficients on wages and prices.
Given the substantial difference in the severity of the IP relationship in the fixed effects and
random effects models, the role of fixed effects in the profit regression here bears consideration. The
argument for using fixed effects hinges on the presence of unmeasured household specific differences that
are correlated with variables on the right-hand side of (2). In the case of the profit regressions, farmer
productivity would seem to be one such factor. If there is unobserved heterogeneity in farmer productivity,
then its impact on the random effects estimates in column (1) would depend on its correlation with the farm
size variable. If smaller farmers cultivate land that is on average of higher quality, then the random effects
estimate of ( would be biased downward, and controlling for fixed-effects should yield an estimate of (
closer to one in the profit regression. Likewise, if differences in productivity arise from the effect of labor
market imperfections, smaller farmers would be more constrained than larger ones, and controlling for
these differences with fixed effects should lead to an estimate of ( closer to one. The fact that the
coefficient on farm size is substantially less in the fixed effects estimates than in the random effects
estimates suggests that something else is going on in the data.
One possible culprit that might exacerbate the IP relationship in the fixed effects estimates is
measurement error. Even if area is measured accurately on average, year-to-year variations may be9
12See Hsiao, pp. 63ff for a thorough discussion of the consistency of different estimators for panel
data in the presence of measurement error.
measured noisily. As is well known, when exogenous variables are subject to measurement error, fixed-
effects estimation will exacerbate the measurement error bias, resulting in coefficient estimates that are
subject to greater bias than the random effects estimates.
12 In the extreme case, if the true variable is
constant for a given household, but is measured with error, then fixed-effects estimation would be a
regression on pure noise. I consider the possible role of measurement error in the IP relationship more fully
below.
The presence of measurement error greatly complicates the question of whether fixed or random
effects is the appropriate model. Testing for the presence of fixed effects is problematic, since the Hausman
test assumes that the fixed-effects estimator is consistent, which is clearly not the case if measurement error
is present. In the case of measurement error, rejection of random effects in favor of fixed effects based on
the Hausman test implies that random effects estimates are different from fixed-effects estimates, but not
necessarily superior. In fact, the fixed effects estimates here would be subject to greater bias than the
random effects, not less. Therefor, I estimate the model using both fixed and random effects estimators to
examine the role that land quality and market imperfections may play in explaining the IP relationship.
Comparison of the results from fixed effects and random effects models may also yield insight into the role
that measurement error plays in generating the IP relationship as well.
III. Inverse Productivity and Land Quality
Benjamin (1995), following a suggestion by Sen (1975), tests the hypothesis that unobserved
variations in land quality explain the inverse productivity relationship in Java rice production. If high-
quality land is subdivided more often than low-quality land, resulting in smaller plots of higher quality,
yields per acre will be greater for smaller farmers. Failure to control for household level differences in land
quality introduces omitted variable bias into the coefficient on farm size (and perhaps others), since farm10
13Bhalla and Roy (1988) find differences in soil quality across households within the same district
partially explain the inverse productivity relationship they observed in the Fertilizer Demand Survey data
from India. However, they failed to control for household fixed effects, which may have biased their
estimates to the extent there are unobserved household characteristics that are correlated with land quality
in their data.
size is correlated with omitted land quality. Since Benjamin lacks information on land quality at the farm
or plot level, he uses instrumental variables (IV) estimation. If the instruments used for farm size are
valid, (esp. uncorrelated with omitted land quality), then the IV estimates should be free from omitted
variable bias. Benjamin argues that his findings are consistent with omitted land quality, but stops short of
arguing that land quality is the culprit. In fact, he formally rejects a structural model of omitted land
quality.
13
One concern in Benjamin’s analysis is the quality of the instruments he uses for farm size. In order
for the IV estimates to address the question of bias arising from missing measures of land quality, they
must be correlated with farm size but uncorrelated with unobserved variations in land quality and land
productivity. An important improvement offered by this study is that the availability of household-level
variables measuring land quality allows for more direct estimation of the importance of land quality than
was possible in Benjamin’s study.
Because the ICRISAT data contain straightforward measures of land quality, including soil type,
the presence of irrigation at the plot level, and the value of land by plot, it is possible to test directly the
hypothesis that variations in land quality explain the IP relationship. If the inverse productivity relationship
arises from differences in land quality, then including variables that measure land quality in the profit
regressions should ameliorate the inverse productivity relationship. Likewise, differences in land quality
may account for the differences in labor use, so including land quality would ameliorate the inverse
relationship in labor demand equations as well.
The ICRISAT data includes information on soil type at the plot level. Each plot was assigned to11
one of nine different soil types. The distribution of types is not uniform across the ICRISAT villages. For
example, over seventy percent of the soil in Aurepalle is classified as shallow red (measured over all years
of the sample), while most of the land in Shirapur is deep black, medium black, or shallow black,
respectively. On the other hand, over eighty percent of the soil in Kanzara is classified as medium black.
So there are substantial differences in land type across villages. Moreover, the composition of plots
changes from year to year, based on changes in sharecropping arrangements and (less frequently) sales or
purchases of land.
Indeed, sharecropping and leasing provide important mechanisms for allowing land quality to
change substantially from year to year. Sharecropping rates are quite high for several of the study villages.
For example, land cultivated by sharecroppers accounted for 35.5 percent of gross cropped area in
Shirapur. Only in Aurepalle was sharecropping rare, accounting for less than 1 percent of land in
cultivation, with fixed rents accounting for another 3.1 percent (Walker and Ryan, p. 172).
An additional measure of soil quality is the per-acre value of each plot. The value is measured by
a village authority who is active in the local economy, so it avoids problems associated with self-reporting
of land values by survey respondents. Moreover, the per-acre value of farm land is probably the best
measure of the inherent productivity of the land. If land values are determined in a present-value model,
then the value represents the sum of expected future returns from farming, appropriately discounted, net of
the value of all inputs. To the extent that these returns reflect the opportunity cost of inputs, the land value
should provide a good measure of net returns. Nonetheless, this variable probably fails to measure
differences in land quality perfectly, since there is room for error given the “opinion-based” nature of the
variable, and the fact that it may be influenced by factors unrelated to its productivity in agriculture.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 report household random effects and fixed effects estimates
(respectively) of the household-level profits regressions when I controlled for variations in land quality.
The dependent variable is the log of total profits, so that a coefficient estimate less than one on the log of12
total cropped area is consistent with the IP relationship. I control for four different soil categories as well
as the share of the household’s total cropped area that is irrigated and the value per-acre of land. In the
random effects regression, the inverse relationship between land productivity and cropped area is greatly
reduced. The estimate of ( rises to 0.97 and is not significantly different from 1 at even the 10 percent
level. Moreover, the variables measuring household-level variations in land quality are highly statistically
significant. A chi-squared test for joint significance has a p-value less than .01, and coefficients on the
share of household’s cultivated land that is irrigated and the average value of cropland are positive and
statistically significant at the one percent level as well. Variables measuring rainfall shocks continue to be
important in explaining profits, with the monsoon onset significant at the one percent level and the
frequency of rainfall days is significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on fertilizer price is
significant and positive while the price of fodder is significant and negative, at odds with theory. Among
the wage variables, the coefficients on first period male wage and second period female wage are significant
and negative, as economic theory would suggest. This is consistent with the observation that second period
tasks dominate in female labor. The second period male wage is positive and statistically significant.
The estimates based on household fixed-effects are similar in most respects to the random effects
estimates. A striking difference is the severity of the inverse relationship: The estimate of ( is 0.71 and is
significantly less than one at the 1 percent level. In the fixed effects estimates, the inverse relationship is
barely mitigated by controlling for household land quality. The coefficients on land value and the share of
irrigated land are positive (as expected) and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and the variables
measuring soil type and land quality are jointly statistically significant at the one percent level.
While including land quality in the profits regression essentially eliminates the inverse relationship
in the random effects estimates, the relationship is stubbornly persistent in the fixed effects estimates. This
is further evidence that the estimated IP relationship itself may reflect in part the effects of measurement
error, which is exacerbated in the fixed effects estimates. The role of land quality in explaining the IP13
relationship in the random effects estimates is still not complete, however. An important dimension of the
observed IP relationship has been in labor demand equations. If controlling for variations in land quality
eliminates the IP relationship in labor demand, then there is strong evidence that land quality may be the
culprit in the observed IP relationship. In fact, Benjamin finds that the inverse relationship is more severe
for labor demand than for either the quantity of physical output or household level profits in his study of
rural Java.
I test for the presence of an inverse relationship in farm labor demand, and the role that land
quality may play in explaining it. I constructed the sum of hours of family and hired labor using the
detailed input and output data in schedule Y of the ICRISAT dataset. I separated labor by gender to reflect
differences in gender roles in the agricultural production. Moreover, because labor use is likely to respond
differently by gender to the weather shocks which are an important part of the production environment,
goodness of fit to the data may be improved by looking at the relationships differently. The dependent
variable in labor demand regressions is the natural logarithm of total labor hours.
Regression results for male and female labor demand conditional on soil quality are summarized in
Table 3; columns (1) and (2) are fixed effects estimates for male and female labor demand, respectively,
and columns (3) and (4) are random effects estimates. I report both fixed effects and random effects
estimates since testing for fixed effects in the presence of possible measurement error is problematic and,
moreover, differences in the two sets of estimates may provide useful information.
The most important finding here is that the estimate of ( was less than one for both males and
females in both fixed effects and random effects estimation. In the random effects estimates (which are less
likely to be biased by measurement error) of male labor demand, ( was estimated to be 0.92 and was
significantly less than one at the 1 percent level. The variables measuring household-level land quality
were jointly significant at the one percent level and the share of irrigated land and average land value were
both positive, suggesting that land and labor are complements in production. Rainfall shocks were jointly14
significant in explaining male labor use at the 1 percent level. Both first and second period male wages
were negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level as suggested by theory, and the female wage
in the first period was positive and significant, suggesting that female and male labor are substitutes in the
first period. The coefficient on monsoon onset was signficant and positive, suggesting that a delay in the
monsoon onset raises male labor use.
In random effects estimate of female labor demand, ( was estimated to be 0.86 and was
significantly less than one at the one percent level. Variables measuring land quality were jointly
significant at the one percent level and the coefficients on irrigated land and the value of cropland are
significant and positive. Surprisingly, rainfall variables were not jointly significant. The coefficient on
first-period female wage was positive and significant, at odds with the predictions of economic theory,
while the second period female wage was negative and significant. The coefficient on fertilizer price was
significant and positive, which seems surprising since fertilizer use should raise the demand for harvest
labor (and perhaps labor for weeding) which is a female task, e.g. fertilizer and female labor should be
complements.
In the fixed effects regressions, estimates of ( were sharply lower: 0.81 for males and 0.80 for
females and were significantly less than 1 at the one percent level. Variables measuring land quality were
jointly significant, as were the rainfall shocks and the wages. The fact that the fixed effects estimates of (
were farther below one than the random effects estimates is further indication that measurement error may
explain the IP relationship.
IV. The Inverse Relationship and Imperfect Markets
While land quality variables explain most (but not all) of the IP relationship in profits, it fails to
explain the IP relationship in labor demand regressions. Moreover, the perverse own-wage coefficient on
first-period wage and fertilizer price in the female labor demand regression suggests that markets for
planting period female labor may not clear in the villages. In the classical model of labor-market dualism,15
farmers with small plots are unable to sell labor in the spot labor market, so they over-allocate labor to
their own plots, driving the marginal (revenue) product of own-farm labor below the market wage rate.
Carter (1984) finds that very small households overallocate labor and other variable inputs to own-farm
production in India, which explains a large part of the inverse productivity relationship. Labor market
failure is not adequate by itself to generate the IP relationship, however. In a simple model of farm size,
Feder (1985) shows that farm size should adjust until the efficient distribution of land across farmers is
achieved. Imperfections in the markets for other productive inputs is necessary to generate the observed
relationship. If, for example, land markets aren’t working well to reallocate land across farm households,
then imperfections in the labor market would combine with imperfections in the land market to generate the
observed IP relationship. In a recent paper Benjamin and Brandt (1997) found that for villages in rural
China, “... where markets were more active, especially land rental markets, excess returns to land were
diminished and inequality was lowest.”
More sophisticated models of market failure might also explain the over-allocation of labor by
small farmers. Principal-agent problems in labor supervision could drive a wedge between the productivity
of own-farm labor and hired labor, causing farmers to overallocate own-farm labor (Eswaran and Kotwol,
1984; Taslim, 1989). Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) posit that imperfect information in a search-
theoretic model of the labor market could result in misallocation of labor, in which net-labor-supply
households fail to supply labor and net-labor-demand households fail to buy labor. Each result would tend
to reinforce the inverse productivity relationship, assuming that net-labor- supply (demand) is negatively
(positively) correlated with farm size.
The semi-arid tropics in India are characterized by a rich assortment of labor and land market
transactions, with considerable participation by most farm households in some form of the village wage
labor market or land rental market. As much as one-half of the women and 40 percent of the men
participate in the labor market, e.g. they work outside their family production activities, suggesting that16
14If female production tasks tend to be more centered around “peak” production times, then demand
for hired female labor will be greater.
15Since this detailed information is only available from 1979 onward, the sample available is
somewhat smaller than for the other regressions, with only 504 households included in the dataset.
hired labor is more important in women’s labor than in men’s.
14 Seventy percent of the families earn
some income from the labor maket (Kochar, p. 51). Land markets are similarly important, especially the
sharecropping of land in and out, and sharecropping varies substantially across villages and within villages
over time, as discussed above.
Of course, if markets do not clear, then prices and wages will not adequately control for the
intensity of input use and the inverse relationship will persist even if prices and wages are included in the
labor demand regressions. A measure of labor-market slack that adequately controls for involuntary
unemployment in the wage labor market would ameliorate, if not eliminate the inverse relationship. The
ICRISAT data allows for construction of such a measure.
I used detailed information contained in Shedule K of the ICRISAT data on the labor market
activities of sample households. From 1979 to 1984 information was collected on the number of days
individual members of the households worked own-farm and off-farm in both agricultural production, and a
number of types of nonagricultural activities. In addition, information on the number of days in the sample
period during which workers looked for work but were unable to obtain it was also collected. I calculated
total labor supply by adding up days worked in all activities, except own-farm production work. To the
extent that the imperfect labor markets view is correct, then including own-farm activities in the measure of
total labor supply would bias the measure of involuntary unemployment. I calculated a gender-specific
unemployment rate for both planting period and harvest period activities by village, where the numerator is
days unemployed and the denominator is days in the labor market (excluding own-farm work days.)
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I also controlled for the degree of activity in the village land market. I constructed a variable17
measuring the average share of land within the village that was either sharecropped in or rented. For most
villages, Aurepalle being an exception, sharecropping is far more important than renting. Benjamin and
Brandt found that such a measure was a useful indicator of how well land markets worked in rural China
early in the 20
th century.
Estimates of labor demand conditional on both land quality and measures of labor and land market
imperfections are reported in Table 4. The random effects estimates of labor demand for male and female
labor (which are less susceptible to measurement error bias if it is present in the data) are given in columns
(3) and (4). For male labor, column 3, the estimate of ( is exactly equal to one. The male unemployment
rate is positive (as expected) and significant for the harvest period only. In contrast, the point estimate of
second period male wage is positive, at odds with economic theory. This suggests that the market for male
labor in the second period may not be clearing. The first period unemployment rate for males is not
significant, while the first period male wage is significant and negative so the market for male labor
appears clear in the first period. The share of land in the village that is sharecropped or leased is not
significant in determining male labor demand. The variables measuring land quality are statistically
significant and have the expected sign.
Random effects estimates for female labor demand are given in column 4. First, while the
estimated ( is not (statistically) significantly different from one, it is rather far away at 0.94. Most
surprising, though, the female unemployment rate in the first and second periods are both negative,
although they are not significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that higher unemployment rates in the
village lead to less female labor use own-farm. The second period female wage is negative and significant,
as expected and the first period female wage was not significantly different from zero. This indicates that
the labor market appears to work in allocating female labor in the second period. The estimated coefficient
on the share of land sharecropped or rented in the village is negative and statistically significant at the 1
percent level, suggesting that the more active the village land market, the less female labor used in own-18
farm production. The first period wage is not significantly different from zero at any reasonable level. Land
quality variables are significant and have the expected sign.
While the fixed-effects estimates are reported in columns (1) and (2), they are not discussed in
detail here, since they are likely to be more susceptible to measurement error bias than the random effects.
In fact, the estimate of ( is 0.83 in both the male and female labor demand regressions, well below the
random effects estimates. This relationship between fixed effects and random effects estimates is consistent
with exacerbated measurement error contributing to the IP relationship in labor demand for the ICRISAT
households.
I also estimated household profit equations conditional on both land quality and labor- and land-
market imperfections. First, the estimate of ( is sharply lower in the fixed effects estimates than the
random effects estimates, consistent with the presence of measurement error in the data. Therefor, the
random effects estimates are less likely to be subject to measurement error bias, and they are highlighted
here. The most significant finding in the random effects estimates is that the ( is now exactly one in the
profits regression, so that the IP relationship is completely explained away by the combination of land
quality and market imperfections. Beyond that, household profits are positively related to output prices and
negatively to the price of fertilizer. The coefficient on the share of land sharecropped or rented in the
village is statistically significant and negative. The village unemployment rates and the degree of
sharecropping or leasing are jointly statistically significant. The interpretation of the coefficients on
village unemployment rates requires some care. Since family labor is valued at the prevailing wage, then to
the extent that labor is over-applied to own-farm production when unemployment is high, it will reduce
household profits as suggested by the negative (and significant) coefficient on first period male labor. Land
quality variables are significant and have the expected sign. These results suggest that there may be
important interactions between labor and land market imperfections and the distribution of land quality
across households.19
16I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.
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V. Does measurement error contribute to the inverse productivity relationship?
Labor market imperfections and differences in land quality appear to play a substantial role in
explaining the IP relationship for both profits and labor in the ICRISAT data.In the random effects
estimates of profit and male labor demand regressions the IP relationship is eliminated by controlling for
differences in land quality and labor and land market imperfections; for female labor the estimate of ( is
not statistically different from one.In the fixed effects estimates, however, the IP relationship is stubbornly
persistent.One explanation that accounts for the persistence of the IP relationship in the fixed effects (but
not random effects) estimates is the possibility of measurement error in the variable measuring farm size.
16
Suppose that the observed variable Ait* is measured with error, so that:
Then the estimable relationship is given by:
where the error term is In this case, the least squares estimator for ", $, and ( will be eit ' uit & (0it.
biased, since the error term eit is correlated with the regressor Ait
*through the random variable 0it. Either
random or fixed effects estimates will be biased (and inconsistent) although the bias is exacerbated when
fixed effects are used. This is consistent with the pattern of coefficient estimates encountered above, in
which the fixed effects estimates of ( were always further below one than the random effects estimates.
This is the first indication that measurement error may play a role in explaining the IPrelationship. If the
fixed-effects themselves are meant to pick up the effect of omitted factors like land quality that are20
17For a derivation, see Benjamin, p. 73.
18The Hausman’s test statistic for a test of the null hypothesis Ho: (fe = (iv is given by





Therefor, a z-test of the null hypothesis Ho: (fe = (iv would serve as a test for measurement error.
negatively correlated with farm size, they should be closer to one than the random effects estimates. That
they are further from one is supportive of the measurement error explanation.
Of course, under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the elasticity of profits and labor
demands with respect to area farmed (()should all be one.
17 Since area farmed is the same variable in the
profits and labor regressions, it must be mismeasured to the same extent in both. If measurement error
were the only source of the IP relationship, then estimates of ( would be the same in profit and labor
demand regressions. In the random effects estimates, ( remains below one in the female labor demand
regression, but not the profit regression or male labor demand regressions. A plausible explanation for this
might be more severe labor market imperfections for female than male labor, which is not adequately
controlled by the unemployment rates. However, in the fixed effects estimates, estimates of ( are further
from one in the profit regression than the labor demand regression. This is inconsistent with measurement
error being the only source of the IP relationship, although measurement error may still play a role, as
indeed a comparison of fixed and random effects estimates suggests.
One method for achieving unbiased estimates of ( is to use an instrumental variables estimator to
get rid of measurement error bias. Estimating the equations again using instrumental variables and
comparing the estimated coefficients with those above can help in determining whether measurement error
plays a role. The Hausman test may be used to see whether estimates generated using instrumental
variables are different than those generated using least squares.
18 In particular, if there is no measurement
error present in Ait, both the fixed effects estimator and an instrumental variables estimator (also
controlling for fixed effects)will be unbiased, but the fixed effects estimator will be efficient, in the sense21
of having a “smaller” variance-covariance matrix. If Ait is measured with error, the fixed-effects estimator
is biased, while an instrumental variable estimator will be unbiased.
In order to estimate the equations using instrumental variables one needs instruments for log total
area that are both correlated with area, but uncorrelated with the error term in the equation being estimated
and that do not belong in the structural equation of interest. That is, instruments should be orthogonal to
uit.Finding instruments that are correlated with farm size is straightforward; finding instruments that are
uncorrelated with uit poses more of a problem. In principal, lagged values of log area would be one
possibility, but in fact these fail the orthogonality condition based on tests of the over-identifying
restrictions. Moreover, there is no reason to think that instruments which are uncorrelated with the error
term in the profit equation are necessarily uncorrelated with the error term in the labor demand equation, or
vice versa, adding another layer of complexity. Other possible instruments for total area farmed are
dummy variables for sharecropping or renting in land, and double-cropping by the household. These suffer
from the criticism that they may be endogenous in the current period (that is, correlated with the error
term), although it is possible to test this by testing the over-identifying restrictions. Thus, these form the
basis for the IV estimation that follows.
Results of the instrumental estimations are reported in Table 5. Since measurement error is most
likely to contribute significantly to the IP relationship in the fixed-effects model, the focus is on fixed
effects estimates. If IV estimation eliminates the inverse relationship in the fixed effects model, then this
suggests that in fact measurement error may be contributing to the observed relationship. The first-stage
regression explaining area farmed is reported in column (1). Area farmed is positively correlated with total
rainfall. Larger farms have on average less irrigation and are worth less than smaller farms. Both
instruments used, dummy variables for sharecropping/leasing and double cropping are statistically
significant at the one percent level. The first-stage regression explained about 40 percent of the within-
household variation in area farmed.22
19See, for example, Nakamura and Nakamura.
The instrumental variables, fixed effects estimates for the profit regression are given in column (2).
I condition on variables measuring land quality and labor and land market imperfections; so the results in
column (2)of Table 5 are comparable to those reported in column (5)of Table 4. The most striking
feature of these results is that the estimate of ( is numerically equivalent to 1 -- the inverse productivity
relationship in profits completely disappears. Coefficient estimates from the IV regression are otherwise
quite similar to those obtained with fixed effects, with the exception of coefficients on the share of irrigated
land and the average value of land. Both these variables have stronger effects in the IV regression than the
fixed effects regression, suggesting a downward bias in the fixed effects estimates. Test of the over-
identifying restrictions suggest that the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions hold can not be
rejected at any reasonable level of significance. The Hausman test statistic for measurement error has a p-
value of only 0.12, but the Hausman test is well known to have low power against in identifying a false
null.
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Instrumental variables estimates of female labor demand equations (using household fixed effects)
are reported in column (4)of Table 5; these results may be compared with those in column (2)of Table 4.
The inverse relationship in female labor demand is completely eliminated in the IV estimates. While the
estimated ( is 1.12, it is not statistically different from 1. Coefficient estimates for wages and prices and
labor market variables are in line with those obtained using fixed effects. One notable difference in the
results is that the amount of land sharecropped or leased in the village is far less important in explaining
female labor demand in these regressions, and is not statistically significant. The Hausman test statistic for
measurement error has a p-value of 0.05, indicating statistical support for the presence of measurement
error, e.g. I can reject a null hypothesis of no measurement error in this case.
Surprisingly, the IV fixed-effects estimates of male labor demand did not offer any improvement in23
the IP relationship (column3, Table 5). The estimate of ( remained unchanged at 0.83, and other
coefficient estimates differed very little from the fixed effects estimates. A possible explanation is that the
instruments used for area farmed are not uncorrelated with the error term in the male labor equation.
VI. Conclusion.
This paper finds that while land quality and market failures may explain most of the inverse
relationship, especially in random effects estimates, measurement error in the farm size variable likely plays
a role as well, especially in fixed effects estimates. The severity of the IP relationship is far more
pronounced in fixed effects than random effects profit regressions. In random effects estimates, differences
in land quality explain most of the inverse relationship between farm size and profits, but fail to explain the
greater intensity of labor use by smaller farmers. Controlling for imperfections in village labor and land
markets (along with differences in household land quality)wipes out the IP relationship in male labor
demand, but not in female labor. This suggests that there may be important interactions between labor and
land market imperfections and the allocation of land quality across households.
The nagging persistence of the inverse productivity puzzle in the fixed effects estimates suggests
that measurement error may play a role in the IP relationship. The empirical results here, in which the IP
relationship is always more severe in fixed than random effects, are consistent with the well-known
tendency of fixed effects to exacerbate measurement error problems. When instrumental variables
estimation is used to correct for measurement error, the estimated coefficient on area farmed is exactly one
in the (fixed-effects)profits regression, and not statistically different from one in the (fixed-effects)female
labor demand model.
These results suggest an important caveat for empirical research related to farm size debate and
more generally to applied work in developing countries. Given the tendency of farm size to change little
over time, applied researchers should use caution in applying fixed effects models to estimate the




Log total cropped area 2.18 acres
Log real household profits 7.51 rupees
Log hours of male labor 6.50 hours
Log hours of female labor 6.54 hours
Average value of land 2607 rupees/acre
Share of irrigated land 0.16 percent
Share, type 1 land 0.09 percent
Share, type 2 land 0.40 percent
Share, type3 land 0.21 percent
Share, type 5 land 0.19 percent
Share, type 6 land 0.02 percent
Real wage, male, period 1 0.80 rupees/hour
Real wage, male, period 2 0.83 rupees/hour
Real wage, female, period 1 0.46 rupees/hour
Real wage, female, period 2 0.51 rupees/hour
Real fertilizer price 2.83 rupees/kg
Real price of sorghum 1.70 rupees/kg
Real price of fodder 27.3 rupees/quintal26
Table 2
The Inverse Productivity Relationship in ICRISAT Data
1
Dependent Variable: Log of household profits
=========================================================================
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Log total cropped area
2 0.89*** 0.62*** 0.97 0.71***
(2.57) (4.53) (0.72) (3.48)
Monsoon onset -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*
(-2.95) (-2.05) (-3.96) (-1.83)
Monsoon end -0.001 -0.000 0.00 0.00
(-0.67) (-0.12) (0.17) (0.45)
Frequency of days with rain -0.79 -0.87 -0.81 -0.61
(-1.59) (-1.54) (-1.62) (-1.06)
Total rainfall 0.000 0.000 0.00 -0.00
(1.34) (0.26) (1.45) (-0.48)
Real fertilizer price 0.22** 0.24 0.32*** 0.35**
(2.24) (1.44) (3.05) (2.02)
Real sorghum price -0.04 -0.009 0.05 0.00
(-0.30) (-0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
Real fodder price -0.004 -0.01** -0.0*** 1 -0.02***
(-1.04) (-2.00) (-3.34) (-3.05)
Real wage, male, -0.82* -0.69 -0.76 -1.25
period 1 (-1.65) (-0.92) (-1.54) (-1.59)
Real wage, male 1.33*** 0.67 1.52*** 0.40
period 2 (2.65) (0.74) (2.72) (0.64)
Real wage, female 0.55 0.72 0.59 1.77*
period 1 (0.98) (0.78) (1.07) (1.75)
Real wage, female -0.06 0.91 -1.33* 0.45
period 2 (-0.10) (1.03) (-1.77) (0.63)
Share of irrigated land *** *** 1.14*** 0.71**
(6.61) (2.31)
Average value of cropland *** *** 19.43*** 18.22***
(5.78) (3.54)
Test for joint significance of wages 4.82 5.28 39.11 5.49
and prices (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)26
Table 2, continued
=========================================================================
Test for joint significance of rainfall 3.34 3.50 16.99 3.99
(p-value) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)




1 Values in parentheses are t-statistics. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber/White
correction in fixed effects estimates.
2 Reported t-statistic is for a test of the null hypothesis that (=1.
3 Includes variables for the share of different soil types not reported in tables.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
*** Significant at the 1 percent level27
Table 3
Labor Demand and the Inverse Relationship
1
(Household Fixed Effects, White standard errors)
Dependent Variable: Log total hours, by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female Male Female
Fixed Effects Random Effects
============================================================================================
Log total cropped area
2 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.92*** 0.86***
(-4.00) (-3.68) (-4.08) (-5.03)
Monsoon onset 0.01*** -0.00 0.01*** 0.00
(5.31) (-1.19) (7.11) ( 0.25)
Monsoon end 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*
(0.91) (-0.63) (0.97) (-1.63)
Frequency of days 1.03*** 0.44 0.81*** -0.06
with rainfall (5.09) (1.75) (3.84) (-0.22)
Total rainfall -0.06*** 0.02 -0.00*** 0.03*
(-4.68) (1.00) (-5.85) (1.64)
Real wage, male, -0.17 0.05 -0.58*** -1.10***
period 1 (-0.64) (0.14) (-2.69) (-3.63)
Real wage, male -0.32 0.16 -0.71*** 0.62*
period 2 (-1.10) (0.41) (-2.94) (1.86)
Real wage, female 0.94*** 0.25 2.03*** 1.88***
period 1 (2.62) (0.51) (8.00) (5.19)
Real wage, female -0.04 -0.41 0.14 -1.13**
period 2 (-0.12) (-0.81) (0.42) (-2.51)
Real price of sorghum 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.02
(4.06) (2.67) (4.33) (0.28)
Real price of fodder -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01***
(-0.16) (-1.19) (-4.37) (-3.69)
Real price of fertilizer -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.23***
(-1.48) (-0.20) (-0.60) (3.53)
Share of irrigated land 1.12*** 1.09*** 1.38*** 1.34***
(8.14) (6.59) (17.72) (12.10)
Average value of cropland 0.89 5.58** 5.39*** 9.23***




Test for joint significance 11.47 3.98 68.79 7.27
of rainfall (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12)
Test for joint significance of 4.00 2.04 99.00 59.11
of prices/wages (p-value) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Test for joint significance of 10.54 12.61 564.4 321.7
land-quality (p-value)
5 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
===========================================================================================
1 Includes variables for the share of different soil types not reported in tables; values in parentheses are t-statistics.
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber/White correction in fixed effects estimates.
2 Reported t-statisticis for a test of the null hypothesis that (=1.
* Statistically significant at the ten percent level
** Statistically significant at the five percent level
*** Statistically significant at the one percent level29
Table 4
Labor Demand and Profits, conditional on labor and land market variables
1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female Male Female Profits Profits
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed effects Random
Effects
Log total cropped area
2 0.83*** 0.83** 1.00 0.94 0.62*** 1.00
(-3.23) (-2.24) (-0.18) (-1.54) (-2.94) (0.17)
Monsoon onset -0.01 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01** -0.02 -0.01
(-1.51) (-2.20) (-1.32) (-2.13) (-1.48) (-0.75)
Monsoon end -0.00 0.00 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 0.00
(-0.79) (1.50) (-2.49) (-1.85) (-0.01) (0.81)
Frequency of days 1.51** 1.49*** 0.47 1.41* 9.97*** 5.91***
with rainfall (1.96) (2.56) (0.88) (1.81) (5.20) (4.35)
Total rainfall 0.05** 0.08*** 0.00 0.00** -0.08 -0.00
(2.38) (2.77) (1.45) (2.46) (-1.29) (-1.18)
Real wage, male, -0.48 0.90 -1.15** -1.70** -2.19 -0.49
period 1 (-0.70) (0.89) (-2.20) (-2.15) (-1.13) (-0.39)
Real wage, male 2.02*** 1.28* 1.64*** 2.41*** 1.77 1.35
period 2 (4.27) (1.79) (3.17) (3.18) (1.12) (1.04)
Real wage, female 2.68*** 0.12 2.65*** 0.83 5.65*** 1.86
period 1 (4.28) (0.13) (4.27) (0.94) (3.03) (1.18)
Real wage, female -4.95*** -6.22*** -2.54*** -3.45*** -7.21* -1.91
period 2 (-2.95) (-2.68) (-2.90) (-2.72) (-1.77) (-0.87)
Real price of sorghum -0.60*** -0.08** -0.54** 0.01 3.47*** 1.75***
(-2.97) (-0.26) (-2.34) (0.20) (4.81) (3.01)
Real price of fodder 0.04** 0.07*** 0.01* 0.02** 0.07* 0.01
(2.39) (3.03) (1.85) (2.23) (1.66) (0.51)
Real price of fertilizer 0.50* 0.56* 0.32** -0.14 -1.16* -1.20*
(1.83) (1.64) (2.22) (-0.69) (-1.77) (-1.90)
Unemployment rate, -2.28 -6.57*** 0.98 -1.91 -17.05*** -9.85***
Male period 1 (-1.25) (-2.60) (1.07) (-1.40) (-4.07) (-4.30)
Unemployment rate 4.70*** 3.51* 3.47*** 1.52 4.65 3.67




Unemployment rate, 0.02 -0.36 -1.38** -1.41 4.10** 5.03***
female period 1 (0.02) (-0.40) (-2.21) (-1.55) (2.20) (3.12)
Unemployment rate, -1.28 1.30 -1.91** -1.49 -4.26* -1.80
Female period 2 (-1.24) (1.00) (-2.41) (-1.29) (-1.92) (-0.88)
Village share of land -1.14** -5.17 -0.11 -4.57*** -22.89*** -6.94***
sharecropped in (-0.37) (-1.35) (-0.15) (-4.02) (-3.26) (-3.70)
Share of irrigated land 1.15*** 1.33*** 1.39*** 1.40*** 0.27 0.96***
(7.23) (5.55) (13.70) (9.25) (0.70) (3.91)
Average value of cropland 2.42 -1.20 5.45*** 6.64** 8.91 18.30***
(0.951) (-0.31) (2.95) (2.33) (1.59) (4.09)
Test for joint significance 3.77 3.25 9.42 18.20 7.72 20.62
of rainfall (p-value) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Test for joint significance 5.00 2.83 27.91 23.6 4.57 39.21
of prices/wages (p-value) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Test for joint significance 4.56 5.48 19.1 27.5 4.43 34.55
unemployment rates and (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
village sharecropping (p-value)
Test for joint significance 8.75 6.32 318.1 183.3 1.23 93.46
of land quality (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00)
===========================================================================================
1 Includes variables for the share of different soil types not reported in tables; values in parentheses are t-statistics.
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber/White correction.
2 Reported t-statistic is for a test of the null hypothesis that (=1.
* Statistically significant at the ten percent level
** Statistically significant at the five percent level
*** Statistically significant at the one percent level31
Table 5




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log total Area Profits Male Female
=====================================================================
Log total cropped area
2 1.00 0.83* 1.12
(-0.01) (-1.77) (0.86)
Monsoon onset -0.01 -0.02 -0.01* -0.02*
(-1.32) (-1.06) (-1.85) (-1.82)
Monsoon end -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-1.30) (0.13) (-0.67) (1.53)
Frequency of days -0.60 9.92*** 1.51* 2.70**
with rainfall (-0.65) (4.33) (1.73) (2.13)
Total rainfall 0.00* -0.00* 0.00** 0.00*
(1.82) (-1.71) (2.16) (1.88)
Real wage, male, -0.47 -2.22 -0.48 0.87
period 1 (-0.55) (-1.05) (-0.60) (0.74)
Real wage, male 1.00* 1.45* 2.02*** 1.03
period 2 (1.62) (0.92) (3.37) (1.18)
Real wage, female 1.04 5.29*** 2.68*** -0.16
period 1 (1.32) (2.69) (3.57) (-0.14)
Real wage, female -1.18 -6.24 -4.97*** -5.46**
period 2 (-0.66) (-1.39) (-2.90) (-2.20)
Real price of sorghum -0.27 3.59*** -0.61** 0.03
(-0.88) (4.60) (-2.07) (0.06)
Real price of fodder 0.01 0.06 0.04** 0.06**
(0.40) (1.37) (2.38) (2.59)
Real price of fertilizer 0.04* -1.24** 0.50** 0.50
(0.18) (-2.00) (2.10) (1.46)
Unemployment rate, -0.18* -16.10*** -2.30 -5.81**
Male period 1 (-0.09) (-3.21) (1.20) (-2.09)
Unemployment rate 2.18* 3.74 4.72*** 2.80




(1) (2) (3) (4)
=====================================================================
Unemployment rate, 0.28 3.63* 0.02 -0.73
female period 1 (0.35) (1.82) (0.03) (-0.66)
Unemployment rate, -2.01** -3.66 -1.29 1.78
Female period 2 (-2.10) (-1.52) (-1.40) (1.33)
Village share of land 0.42 -22.67*** -1.14 -4.99
sharecropped/leased in (0.14) (-2.94) (-0.39) (-1.17)
Share of irrigated land -0.70*** 0.53 1.14*** 1.53
(-5.53) (1.54) (8.29) (7.64)
Average value of cropland -4.13 11.42* 2.38 0.78
(-1.54) (1.67) (0.91) (0.21)
Dummy for household share- 0.48***
cropping in (9.09)
Dummy for double-cropping 0.25***
(3.88)
Test for joint significance 2.30 24.97 8.93 9.22
of rainfall (p-value) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06)
Test for joint significance 4.07 38.04 27.44 13.06
of prices/wages (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
Test for joint significance 4.44 13.83 20.97 22.83
unemployment rates and (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
village sharecropping (p-value)
Test for joint significance 14.75 9.26 80.83 66.29
of land quality (p-value) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00)
P-value, test for over- 0.94 0.65 0.05*
identifying restrictions
Hausman test for difference 1.54 *** 2.07
between IV and FE estimate (0.12) (0.05)
=====================================================================
* Statistically significant at the ten percent level
** Statistically significant at the five percent level
*** Statistically significant at the one percent level33
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